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Tax Policy and the Dividend Clientele Effect
Summary
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 ( JGTRRA) significantly changed tax policy by
cutting long-term capital gains tax rates and taxing dividend income at the same rates as long-term capital
gains. Following the reduction in the tax disadvantage of dividends, investors gravitated toward dividend-
paying investments—especially high-income investors who previously had faced the highest tax rates on
dividends.
The behavior of investors before and after the passage of JGTRRA suggests that they divide into “clienteles”
based on dividend payouts when the tax disadvantage of dividends varies across investors. Policymakers
therefore need to build a proper appreciation of investor behavior, particularly among affluent households,
into their thinking about any tax reform proposal affecting capital income. If dividend clientele effects are
ignored, estimates of the revenue that can generated by changes in capital tax rates will be off-base.
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“We cannot be satisfied until every part of 
our economy is healthy and vigorous,” Bush 
said. “We will not rest until every business 
has a chance to grow and every person who 
wants to find work can find a job.”1
The centerpiece of the Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003 ( JGTRRA)—passed by Congress 
and signed into law by President Bush six 
months after he proposed it—was a vast 
reduction in taxes on investment income. 
Long-term capital gains tax rates were 
cut, and dividend income was now to be 
taxed at the same rates as long-term capital 
gains (rather than being taxed as ordinary 
income). The act, which built upon the 2001 
Bush tax cuts, was hailed by Republicans 
as a way of bringing immediate benefit to 
the middle class, though Democrats were 
more than skeptical. New York Representa-
tive Charles B. Rangel termed it “an assault 
on the middle-class to the benefit of the 
wealthy.”2
The aggregate effect of JGTRRA on 
the overall economy remains debated. But 
the second set of Bush tax cuts—aspects 
of which were made permanent during the 
Obama Administration—had a large effect 
on individuals’ portfolio choices. High-
income investors substantially increased the 
dividend yields on their equity portfolios, 
according to a study I undertook on the 
impact of changes in dividend and capital 
gains tax rates brought about by JGTRRA. 
taX pOlicy aNd thE diVidENd 
cliENtElE EFFEct 
lauRa KawaNO
In January of 2003, with the economy sagging and the need 
for some sort of stimulus becoming a pressing issue, the 
Administration of President George W. Bush proposed a package 
of tax cuts that would reduce personal taxes, provide a $400-per-
child rebate to most families, and increase the rate at which 
certain businesses could depreciate equipment, so as to stimulate 
small business. 
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This behavior on the part of wealthy 
investors carries important implications for 
tax policy—especially now, as tax reform 
has become a widely-discussed issue. My 
research on the effects of JGTRRA shows 
that investors respond to shifts in tax policy 
to reduce their tax burdens. Such behaviors 
should be taken into account by policymak-
ers seeking to redress the nation’s fiscal defi-
cit by changing tax rates on capital income.3
pOlicy chaNGES uNdER 
JGtRRa
In the U.S., dividends generally have been 
taxed at a higher rate than long-term capital 
gains. Due to the progressivity of the tax 
system, this tax disadvantage of dividends—
the gap between the tax rates on dividends 
and those on long-term capital gains—has 
increased with income. The difference 
between the dividend tax rate and the long-
term capital gains tax rate has been greatest 
for people in the highest tax bracket. 
Previous studies have shown that an 
investor’s optimal portfolio is a function of 
the difference between dividend and capital 
gains tax rates; for a given level of expected 
returns, portfolio dividend yields increase 
as the relative tax disadvantage of divi-
dends falls. Before the passage of JGTRRA, 
therefore, high-income individuals had a 
particularly strong incentive to select stocks 
based on dividend payouts because of their 
tax implications, avoiding those with high 
dividend yields, and investing instead in 
those that would deliver returns in the form 
of long-term capital gains.
JGTRRA changed this calculation. 
With the new legislation, the top marginal 
tax rate on long-term capital gains fell 
from 20 percent to 15 percent, while the 
10 percent rate for lower-income taxpayers 
fell to 5 percent (and then to zero percent 
in 2008). Also, new qualified dividends now 
were taxed in the same way as capital gains 
(rather than at the traditional ordinary-
income marginal tax rates). 
In sum, the top marginal rate for 
dividends fell from 35 percent to 15 percent, 
and, for lower-income taxpayers, from 10 
percent to 5 percent. The change extended 
across dividends from directly owned 
equities, as well as those owned through a 
mutual fund, partnership, real estate invest-
ment trust or common trust fund. This was 
a remarkable break with past tax policy. For 
decades prior to 2003, the long-term capital 
gains tax rate had been much lower than 
the ordinary income rate (except for a brief 
period after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
when dividends and capital gains were both 
taxed at 28 percent).
diVidENd cliENtElES
This change in dividend tax rates provides 
a rare opportunity to test the “dividend 
clientele hypothesis,” the idea that inves-
tors sort into “clienteles” based on dividend 
payouts. Some have preferences for stocks 
that pay dividends while others prefer stocks 
whose expected returns come in the form of 
capital gains when the tax disadvantage of 
dividends varies across investors. To study 
the impact of these tax rate changes on 
equity portfolio choices, I used data from 
before and after JGTRRA to estimate the 
relationship between the dividend yield on 
a household’s equity portfolio and the gap 
between dividend and long-term capital 
gains rates. 
The data come from the Surveys of 
Consumer Finances (SCF) from 2001, 2004 
and 2007. The SCF is a triennial survey 
conducted by the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors; each survey samples about 
4,500 households. An advantage of using 
the SCF for my analysis is that it provides 
detailed information on household invest-
ments and allows for accurate marginal tax 
rate calculations. Also included is informa-
tion that allows me to control for other, 
non-tax-related factors that can influence 
portfolio choices, such as age, marital status, 
household size, educational attainment, risk 
preferences, and optimism about the future 
of the economy.
1   New York Times, January 8, 2003, http://www.ny-
times.com/2003/01/08/us/politics-economy-over-
view-bush-unveils-plan-cut-tax-rates-spur-economy.
html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
2   Ibid.
3   This brief is based on Laura Kawano, “The Dividend 
Clientele Hypothesis: Evidence from the 2003 Tax 
Act,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 
February 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1668158. 
4   Raj Chetty and Emmanuel Saez, “Dividend Taxes and 
Corporate Behavior: Evidence from the 2003 Dividend 
Tax Cut,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (3): 791-
833.
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Timing was important to my analysis, 
especially since people’s expectations influ-
ence their decisions. Capital income tax 
cuts were not part of Bush’s 2000 campaign 
platform. In fact, reductions in dividend 
tax rates were not seriously discussed until 
the end of 2002, just before Bush unveiled 
plans for his second tax cut in an address at 
the Economic Club of Chicago. The data 
from the 2001 SCF survey, derived from 
equity holdings in 2000, therefore are not 
at all affected by JGTRRA, or even by any 
anticipation that legislation like JGTRRA 
was on the horizon. By 2003, though, it was 
clear that dividends probably would be taxed 
at a lower rate. The 2004 and 2007 SCF 
surveys include dividend receipts from 2003 
and 2006, respectively—both of which were 
affected by the 2003 act. A comparison of 
the data from these years can help shed light 
on the impact of the new tax rates.
JGTRRA—the provisions of which 
were made retroactive to January of 2003—
represented a major policy shift, and the 
investor response was dramatic. Following 
the reduction in the tax disadvantage of divi-
dends, investors did in fact gravitate toward 
dividend-paying investments. By closing 
the gap between tax rates on dividends and 
long-term capital gains, dividend income 
became more attractive for all investors—but 
especially for high-income investors who 
previously had faced the highest tax rates on 
dividends. 
When dividends and capital gains 
became taxed similarly, the tax-based incen-
tives for selecting stocks on the basis of divi-
dend yields were dampened. In the same way 
that consumers contemplating a big purchase 
often choose to drive to another, sales-tax-
free state to do their shopping, so did high-
income investors seek and find alternatives 
that were in their best financial interest.
I estimated that because of the 
JGTRRA tax rate changes, households in 
the top bracket increased their portfolio 
dividend yields by 23 percent between 
2001 and 2004. This increase is 13 percent 
higher than the increase experienced by 
those households one bracket below. Longer 
term, the increase for households in the top 
tax bracket was even larger—a 35 percent 
increase in dividend yields, or almost 18 
percent more than those one bracket below. 
These responses provide strong evidence for 
the dividend clientele hypothesis. That is, 
the differential tax treatment of dividends 
and capital gains caused a significant degree 
of investment sorting.
At the same time, firms also responded 
to the tax changes of 2003, increasing their 
dividend payments in response to JGTRRA. 
According to research by Raj Chetty of 
Harvard University and Emmanuel Saez 
of the University of California, Berkeley, 
JGTRRA “indeed raised dividend payments 
significantly, and in particular induced many 
firms to initiate dividend payments.” Chetty 
and Saez find that, following a continuous 
decline in dividend payments during two 
decades, total regular dividends since 2003 
have grown by nearly 20 percent.4
There is also some evidence that 
dividends were initiated at firms at which 
executive compensation was tied to stocks, 
so executives who could gain from the intro-
duction of the new tax rates were the ones 
who ushered in the increases in dividends. 
Perhaps most notably, Microsoft, after long 
resisting calls to pay dividends, began a divi-
dend payout for the first time—at rates that 
have grown since the initial dividend payout.
As a result, part of the portfolio adjust-
ments that I estimated could have reflected 
changes to dividend policies for stocks that 
were already held. Regardless, because indi-
viduals were able to respond to these firm 
changes in payout policies, the tax effects 
that I estimated can still be interpreted as 
reflecting investor choices.
Nevertheless, it is an important question 
to consider how much of the increase could 
be attributed to active portfolio shifts. To 
help sort out this question, I constructed 
hypothetical portfolios from stock market 
data for households in each tax bracket 
that matched observed portfolio dividend 
yields in the 2001 SCF. The increase in 
yields for these proxy portfolios for high-
income households was only a portion of the 
estimated effect of the tax changes. This sug-
gests that active decision-making accounted 
for a significant share of the tax effect.
Was investor response to the 2003 act 
temporary or permanent? Data measuring 
differences between 2001 and 2004, and 
then 2001 and 2007, are similar, suggesting 
a longer-term shift toward higher dividend 
yields. Under the Obama administration, the 
new tax rates were extended through 2010, 
and then again through the end of 2012. 
More recently, the provisions of JGTRRA 
eliminating the difference in the way capital 
gains and dividend income are taxed were 
made permanent. (For individuals in the 
highest tax bracket, the tax rate went back 
up to 20 percent.) These policy changes 
permanently reduced incentives to sort 
into dividend clienteles on the basis of tax 
considerations. 
pOlicy iMplicatiONS
The investor responses to JGTRRA provide 
telling lessons as the nation considers differ-
ent proposals to reduce its long-term deficit. 
Moving forward, policymakers will have to 
seriously consider options that either reduce 
expenditures, increase revenue from taxes, or, 
as is most likely, a mixture of the two. Both 
Democrats and Republicans have signaled a 
desire to consider fundamental tax reform, 
“If policymakers ignore 
dividend clientele effects, their 
estimates of the revenue that 
will be generated by changes 
in capital tax rates will be 
off-base.”
and changes to how capital income is taxed 
could be in the mix. 
It is important to understand investor 
behavior as policymakers consider future 
tax reform options. If investment income 
tax rates increase, knowing how investors 
are likely to react is key to forecasting the 
tax revenue implications of such policies. 
All other things being equal, taxing capital 
income more heavily will increase the tax 
burden of high-income taxpayers. However, 
my research, and the research conducted 
by others, indicates that investors have 
shown both a sophisticated awareness of tax 
policy and a willingness to adjust portfolio 
positions to reduce their tax burdens. The 
evidence strongly suggests a dividend clien-
tele hypothesis at work: investors respond 
to changes in tax policy, rationally seek the 
highest after-tax return, and actively steer 
their portfolios accordingly.
Behavioral responses like the clientele 
effect carry important consequences for the 
impacts of tax policy on the distribution of 
tax burdens, especially as equity holdings 
have historically been concentrated in the 
upper tail of income distribution. Moreover, 
if policymakers ignore dividend clientele 
effects, their estimates of the revenue that 
will be generated by changes in capital tax 
rates will be off-base. Policymakers will need 
to build a proper appreciation of investor 
behavior, particularly among affluent house-
holds, into their thinking about any tax 
reform proposal affecting capital income.
The views expressed in this paper are those of 
the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
policy of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
aBOut thE pENN whaRtON puBlic pOlicy iNitiatiVE
The Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative (PPI) is a hub for 
research and education, engaging faculty and students across Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania and reaching government decision-makers 
through independent, practical, timely, and nonpartisan policy 
briefs. With offices both at Penn and in Washington, DC, the 
initiative provides comprehensive research, coverage, and analysis, 
anticipating key policy issues on the horizon. Penn Wharton PPI 
is led by Faculty Director Mark Duggan, the Rowan Family Foun-
dation Professor and Chair of Business Economics and Public 
Policy, and Professor of Health Care Management at Wharton.
aBOut pENN whaRtON ppi iSSuE BRiEFS
Penn Wharton PPI publishes issue briefs at least once a month, 
tackling issues that are varied but share one common thread: they 
are central to the economic health of the nation and the Ameri-
can people. These Issue Briefs are nonpartisan, knowledge-driven 
documents written by Wharton and Penn faculty in their specific 
areas of expertise.
For additional copies, please visit the Penn Wharton PPI 
website at publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu.
Follow us on Twitter: @PennWharton PPI
Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
Founded in 1881 as the first collegiate business school, the Wharton School of the 
University of Pennsylvania is recognized globally for intellectual leadership and ongoing 
innovation across every major discipline of business education. With a broad global 
community and one of the most published business school faculties, Wharton creates 
economic and social value around the world. 
 
brief in brief
•	 The	Jobs	and	Growth	Tax	Relief	Reconciliation	
Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) significantly changed 
tax policy by cutting long-term capital gains 
tax rates and taxing dividend income at the 
same rates as long-term capital gains.
•	 Following	the	reduction	in	the	tax	disadvan-
tage of dividends, investors gravitated toward 
dividend-paying investments—especially 
high-income investors who previously had 
faced the highest tax rates on dividends.
•	 The	behavior	of	investors	before	and	after	the	
passage of JGTRRA suggests that they divide 
into “clienteles” based on dividend payouts 
when the tax disadvantage of dividends varies 
across investors.
•	 Policymakers	therefore	need	to	build	a	proper	
appreciation of investor behavior, particularly 
among affluent households, into their thinking 
about any tax reform proposal affecting 
capital income. If dividend clientele effects are 
ignored, estimates of the revenue that can 
generated by changes in capital tax rates will 
be off-base.  
